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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY 
FAILURE IN THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER: 
A COMMON LAW COMPARISON 
Joel Rheuben† 
Abstract:  This article considers the Japanese government’s response to the 2011 
Fukushima nuclear power disaster, in assisting Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(“TEPCO”) with handling claims for compensation.  It argues that in setting guidelines 
for claims, establishing a government alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) body to deal 
with disputes, and creating a convoluted funding structure that has led to the effective 
nationalization of TEPCO, the government has intervened significantly in what are 
essentially private disputes governed by the Nuclear Compensation Law.  This is 
contrasted with the less interventionist response of the New South Wales government in 
Australia to mass tort claims for asbestos exposure.  This article argues that this 
difference in approach can be attributed to the respective scope of state liability for 
regulatory failure in Japan and common law countries.  Whereas courts in common law 
countries have imposed a high threshold for establishing the liability of public authorities, 
Japanese courts have acknowledged liability more readily, creating an incentive for the 
Japanese government to divert potential claims against itself from the courts. 
I. Introduction 
In March 2011 the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in north-
eastern Japan attained the nearly unique distinction of experiencing a nuclear 
disaster measuring level seven on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
International Nuclear Event Scale.  The events of the disaster are now so 
well-known that they require only a cursory summary here.1  In short, the 
earthquake that devastated much of Japan’s north-east (Tōhoku) region on 
11 March also succeeded in damaging electricity transmission between the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi plant and nearby transformers. 2   Emergency diesel 
generators were automatically activated onsite, but these too were destroyed 
when the tsunami that followed less than an hour after the earthquake 
breached the breakwaters surrounding the coastal plant, cutting off all 
                                                      
† Joel Rheuben is a Solicitor (New South Wales) and an LLM candidate at the University of Tokyo.  
The author is very grateful and would like to thank to Professors Dan Foote, Rob Leflar, Luke Nottage, 
Katsuya Uga and Greg Weeks for comments on an earlier draft of this article.  Any residual errors are the 
author’s own.  This article is an expanded and reworked version of the author’s chapter in SIMON BUTT, et 
al., Asia-Pacific Disaster Management: Comparative and Socio-Legal Perspectives (Springer 2013 
forthcoming), originally presented at the Disaster Management and Japanese Law workshop held at 
Tohoku University on 9 February 2013.  
1  See generally FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION 
(2012) for a full overview. 
2 Id. at 12. 
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electricity to the cooling systems for the plant’s six reactors and precipitating 
a meltdown in three of them.3  As the crisis worsened and radiation leaked 
from the plant, more than 150,000 people were forcibly evacuated from the 
surrounding area, and many more left voluntarily.4   
In the months following the disaster, four separate committees were 
established to investigate and report on the causes of the disaster.5  Several 
of these committees’ reports, and in particular the report of the National 
Diet’s Independent Investigation Commission, attribute the disaster to a 
systemic lack of safety precautions common throughout the nuclear power 
industry in Japan, and to a series of costly judgment errors. 6   The 
Independent Investigation Commission’s report does not limit its criticism to 
the Fukushima plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(“TEPCO”); instead, it also sternly rebukes regulators for falling “captive” 
to the industry—relying on the industry for nuclear know-how and failing to 
put in place or enforce adequate safety standards. 7   The report of the 
“Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident,” a private body, is equally scathing of a bureaucratic culture 
within the main regulatory bodies that prevented the development of 
independent technological expertise and was resistant to change. 8   The 
reports of both independent investigation commissions categorize the 
Fukushima disaster as a classic case of regulatory failure.9 
Under the Nuclear Compensation Law, 10  the main legislation 
governing civil claims for nuclear accidents, TEPCO alone bears direct 
liability for compensating the tens of thousands of evacuees and businesses 
                                                      
3 Id. 
4  Id. at 19. 
5  See id.  TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS REPORT 
14-15 (2011); INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 
OF TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 
ACCIDENT AT FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS OF TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY 1 (2012); 
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, FUKUSHIMA 
GENPATSU JIKO DOKURITSU KENSHŌ IINKAI CHŌSA/KENSHŌ HOKOKUSHO [INVESTIGATION/VERIFICATION 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT] 
(2012).  
6 FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10. 
7  INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, supra note 
5, at 16. 
8  Id. at 288-90. 
9 See generally FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION, supra 
note 1, at 42-45; INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, 
supra note 5, at ch. 7. 
10  Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-
docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf. 
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who continue to be affected by radiation.11  Since this liability is estimated 
to be significantly more than the value of TEPCO’s assets, the Japanese 
government has provided TEPCO with financial assistance to prevent 
insolvency.12  As explained in Part II.B. below, the government has also 
established a mediation center, the Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear 
Damage Compensation, under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (“MEXT”) to handle compensation disputes 
between TEPCO and its victims.13  If the government was content to give 
TEPCO free rein to conduct its business before the accident, it seems that it 
has taken a far stronger interest in intervening in the aftermath. 
This article argues that the mechanisms established for resolving and 
funding payouts in disputes between claimants and TEPCO in the aftermath 
of Fukushima should be viewed against the backdrop of the government’s 
own potential liability for the disaster.14  No doubt there are compelling 
political and economic reasons for the government to have intervened and to 
have prevented TEPCO’s insolvency.15  However, from the perspective of 
the government’s own legal liability, the manner in which it has intervened 
can be explained by the ever-present risk that claimants, dissatisfied with the 
amount of TEPCO’s compensation or the speed of its response, could move 
their complaints to the courts and sue the government for its failure to 
prevent the nuclear disaster. 
As noted below, there is ample precedent for Japanese courts finding 
national and local governments liable for regulatory failure.16  This situation 
is not unique to Japan: courts in Germany, from which Japan draws much of 
its public law jurisprudence, have also consistently found against 
                                                      
11  Id. at art. 3 (albeit subject to certain exemptions.  See infra, Part II.B). 
12 See generally Kōji Aribayashi, Genshiryoku songai baishō shien kikō hō no seitei to gaiyō [The 
Establishment of and an Overview of the Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund Law], 1433 
JURISUTO (2011) (on file with author).   
13 See generally Daniel H. Foote, Japan’s ADR System for Resolving Nuclear Power-Related 
Damage Disputes (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
14  See Eric A. Feldman, Fukushima: Catastrophe, Compensation, and Justice in Japan, 62 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 335, 341 (2013) (arguing that there is a weak tradition of direct government compensation in 
natural and other major disasters in Japan.  He points to the fact that there has been no move to provide 
comprehensive compensation for Tōhoku residents outside of the nuclear-affected area who lost their 
homes due to the earthquake or tsunami).   
15 See generally Hatsuru Morita, Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal and Political 
Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2026868. 
16  The author uses the term “regulatory failure” here to refer to the failure to exercise a range of 
discretionary functions, and not simply functions related to passing regulations (rule-making functions). 
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government for failure to exercise regulatory functions.17  However, it does 
stand in stark contrast with the situation in common law countries, where 
courts have historically set a high threshold for finding public authorities 
liable in tort for the exercise of regulatory functions in general, and for 
regulatory failure in particular.18 
This article compares Japan’s approach to liability for regulatory 
failure with that of courts in common law countries, and Australia in 
particular.  To illustrate the implications of potential liability on structuring 
government responses to disasters, I use the example of mass tort litigation 
for asbestos-related diseases in New South Wales (“NSW”), Australia’s 
most populous state. 
No common law country has suffered a nuclear accident comparable 
to the Fukushima disaster.19  Indeed, Australia does not even have a nuclear 
power industry.  The Fukushima disaster occurred amidst one of the most 
catastrophic events in Japanese history—namely, the Tōhoku earthquake and 
tsunami—and had the potential to be even more catastrophic still.  Naturally, 
then, it is difficult to predict how any government or court faced with the 
same circumstances would respond, and so any comparisons necessarily 
must be tenuous. 
Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between radiation from 
nuclear power generation and environmental exposure to asbestos.  Both 
involve man-made risks, and, unlike natural disasters, are potentially subject 
to regulation to minimize harm.  Both involve potentially fatal hazards to 
health, further raising the expectation that any regulatory response will be 
robust.  However, in the specific examples of the Fukushima disaster and the 
regulation of asbestos in Australia, these expectations have been arguably 
unmet.  The willingness of courts to intrude upon administrative discretion 
by considering the reasonableness of the regulatory response is therefore 
instructive.  Indeed, it is in the context of asbestos litigation that the 
Australian principles of government liability for regulatory failure have been 
most clearly articulated. 
                                                      
17 See Ralph-Andreas Surma, A Comparative Study of the English and German Judicial Approach to 
the Liability of Public Bodies in Negligence, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 355, 364-78 (Duncan Fairgrieve, et al. eds., 2002). 
18 See generally Mark Aronson, Government Liability in Negligence, 32 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 42  
(2008); Greg Weeks, Private Law Litigation Against the Government: Are Public Authorities and Private 
Actors Really 'the Same?' (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1604324. 
19 In comparison, the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States was contained before a 
full reactor meltdown occurred, and although generating a small amount of litigation, did not lead to an 
indefinite evacuation of large numbers of residents requiring compensation. 
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The example of asbestos litigation in NSW demonstrates the potential 
responses available to governments in common law countries in similar 
circumstances.  Both nuclear power facilities and building products 
containing asbestos are to some degree integrated into daily life in 
residential areas (unlike, for example, oil spills), raising the potential for 
large numbers of indeterminate claims by poorly-resourced claimants—
whether against the primary tortfeasor or the government.  Indeed, as noted 
below, the rates of asbestos-related diseases in Australia (and NSW in 
particular) are the highest in the world, and the number of associated claims 
are proportionally comparable to those arising from the Fukushima disaster.  
Both have given rise to a need to deal with disputes quickly and to avoid 
overburdening the ordinary courts.  Uniquely among common law countries, 
the NSW government’s response to mass tort litigation for asbestos exposure 
was the creation of a special tribunal (the Dust Diseases Tribunal), 20 
allowing comparison with the Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear 
Damage Compensation. 
Asbestos claims in NSW have also largely been brought against a 
single defendant, the James Hardie group, whose Australian-based assets 
have proven insufficient to meet its ongoing liabilities.21  The example of 
mass asbestos litigation in Australia therefore further offers a useful 
comparison of how governments have faced the problem of ensuring that the 
primary defendant remained adequately capitalized and sufficiently 
responsive to claimants. 
This article argues that whereas the Japanese approach to the 
Fukushima disaster has been interventionist, ultimately leading to the 
effective nationalization of TEPCO, the NSW government in its response to 
mass tort claims has taken a far less dirigiste approach.  This is not to 
suggest that governments in common law countries never take a more 
interventionist approach to resolving mass disputes—indeed, depending on 
political and economic factors they may well do.  However, free from 
concern over their own potential liability, the NSW experience suggests that 
they do not need to. 
                                                      
20 See John L. O’Meally, Asbestos Litigation in New South Wales, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1209-1213 
(2007) (noting that the only other body of this type in the common law world is in Tasmania, another 
Australian state). 
21 See generally Edwina Dunn, James Hardie: No Soul to be Damned and No Body to be Kicked, 27 
SYDNEY L. REV. 339 (2005). 
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II.  THE FUKUSHIMA DISASTER COMPENSATION FRAMEWORK 
This Part explains Japan’s nuclear disaster compensation scheme.  
Specifically, this Part posits that A) TEPCO is the sole defendant under 
Japan’s Nuclear Compensation Law, B) the Japanese government guides the 
TEPCO compensation scheme, and C) financial assistance from the 
government has effectively nationalized TEPCO.   
A. TEPCO is the Sole Defendant Under the Nuclear Compensation Law 
Compensation for losses arising from nuclear accidents, and hence 
TEPCO’s own liability, is principally governed by the Nuclear 
Compensation Law, the provisions of which take precedence over the 
general tort provisions of the Civil Code.  The law is aimed at ensuring 
sufficient access to compensation by victims in the event of a nuclear 
accident by way of clear principles of liability and the imposition of a 
mandatory insurance scheme.22  It generally accords with the principles of 
the 1960 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, insofar as 
liability under the law is strict and centered exclusively on nuclear power 
operators.23  Operators are exempted from liability only where damages have 
occurred as a result of a major natural disaster of an exceptional character or 
social unrest.24  Where damages are attributable to a third party, operators 
still retain primary liability, but can cross-claim against the third party for 
recovery.25  However, whereas the Paris Convention sets an upper limit on 
the liability of operators,26 under the Nuclear Compensation Law liability is 
unlimited.27  
The law applies to all claims in respect of “nuclear damage,” defined 
as “damages caused by the effects of fission of nuclear fuel material, the 
effects of radiation from nuclear fuel material, or the toxic effects of such 
material.”28  On its face, this definition would appear to restrict liability to 
                                                      
22 Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan). 
23 Id. at art. 3.  For the Convention’s text, see http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html (last 
visited August 29, 2013). 
24  Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan). 
25  Id. at art. 5. 
26 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, art. VII, July 29, 1960, 
available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html. 
27 See Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan).  The statute provides the basis for operator liability, but 
makes no reference to limitation of liability. 
28  Id. at art. 1(2). 
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physical damage resulting directly from radiation.  However, in the small 
handful of reported cases under the Nuclear Compensation Law following 
Japan’s previous worst nuclear accident—the radiation leak from a fuel 
conversion plant in Tōkaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 199929—courts applied 
a broader, causation-based test. 30   A causal relationship was found, for 
example, between the accident and subsequent reputational damage to 
vegetable growers in the area.31  The scope of damages for which TEPCO 
alone could potentially be found liable on a strict and unlimited basis is 
therefore quite wide. 
In order to meet the anticipated high costs of a major nuclear accident, 
the Nuclear Compensation Law obliges operators to purchase insurance up 
to a minimum indemnification amount of JPY 120 billion per plant, or else 
to make a deposit of the full amount with the government.32  Beyond this, 
operators bear the costs of compensation alone, although the law requires the 
government to “assist” operators where the government “deems it 
necessary.”33  The nature of this assistance is not specified and theoretically 
ranges from free money to low-interest finance, to the acquisition of an 
equity interest in the operator (which, indirectly, is what has occurred in the 
case of TEPCO).34 
Aside from this vague requirement of assistance, and consistent with 
the principle of operator-only liability, there is no explicit provision under 
the Nuclear Compensation Law that assigns liability to the government, nor 
any right to recourse against the government by either operators or victims.  
Where operators are excluded from liability as a result of an exceptional 
natural disaster or social unrest, the government is required to “take 
                                                      
29  See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), Report on the Preliminary Fact Finding Mission 
Following the Accident at the Nuclear Fuel Processing Facility in Takaimura, Japan (1999), available at 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TOAC_web.pdf. 
30 See Mitō Chihō Saibansho [Mito Dist. Ct.] June 24, 2003, Hei 12 (wa) no. 487; Tōkyō Chihō 
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sep. 27, 2004, Hei 14 (wa) 19606 (Japan); Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo 
Dist. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) 6644; Mitō Chihō Saibansho [Mito Dist. Ct.] Feb. 27, 2008, Hei 14 
(wa) 513; Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2008, Hei 19 (wa) 7869 (Japan); Tōkyō 
Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 23, 2008, Hei 16 (wa) 21303 (Japan). 
31  Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2008, Hei 19 (wa) 7869; Tōkyō Chihō 
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) 6644. 
32 Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan). 
33  Id. at art.16. 
34 Feldman, supra note 14, at 344 (arguing that the government could have taken over the 
compensation process itself, but chose not to because of its traditional aversion to compensating after 
natural disasters).  However, based on the current wording of the provision, direct government 
compensation arguably would not be possible, since the government is required to do no more than assist 
the operator in making payments. 
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necessary measures to relieve victims and to prevent further damage,”35 but 
this requirement again falls short of an enforceable civil remedy.  Early 
drafts of the law did in fact impose an obligation on the government to 
compensate victims above the operator’s insurance threshold, but this was 
removed at the insistence of the finance ministries, precisely because of 
concern over open-ended liability.36 
 
B. The TEPCO Compensation Scheme has been Guided by the 
Government 
TEPCO is, therefore, the first and only port of call for members of the 
public seeking compensation for the Fukushima disaster under the Nuclear 
Compensation Law, whether by direct or mediated settlement, or by civil 
action.  There may be arguments that the scale of the Tohoku earthquake and 
subsequent tsunami were so unforeseeable that the exemption to liability 
provision applies, absolving TEPCO of liability.  However, the bulk of 
academic opinion in and outside of Japan weighs against this proposition,37 
and TEPCO itself has arguably forfeited any right to rely on this exemption 
by voluntarily making compensation payments.38 
At the behest of the Ministry for the Economy, Trade and Industry 
(“METI”), TEPCO initiated provisional compensation payments of up to 
JPY one million per household to claimants in the area immediately 
surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant from late April 2011.39  At the 
same time, the government began making provisional payments to affected 
small and medium-sized businesses in the region, particularly those in the 
                                                      
35  Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 1 (Japan). 
36  Takeshi Hitomi, Fukushima dai-ichi genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko no songai baishō 
[Compensation for Damages from the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant], 56 
HŌGAKU SEMINAA, at 21 (2011) (on file with author); Masatada Akimoto, Genshiryoku Songai Baishō: 
Higai Kyūsai Hōri no Kokoromi [Nuclear Damages Compensation: An Approach for Legal Principles for 
Victim Relief] 63 JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE], at 25 (2012) (on file with author). 
37  See Eri Osaka, Corporate Liability, Government Liability and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 443, 444-47 (2012) (arguing that the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami were well 
within the range of predictable natural disasters according to the standards set by the Atomic Energy 
Commission). 
38  See Yomiuri Shimbun, Tōden ni menseki futekiyō wa ayamari . . . kabunushi ga teiso, kuni wa 
hanron [Not Applying the Exemption to TEPCO was an Error . . . Shareholders Bring Suit, the State 
Responds], Oct. 20, 2011 (derivative suit brought by a group of TEPCO shareholders against the national 
government on this basis) (on file with author). 
39 Nikkei Shimbun, Keikaku hinan mo kari-barai Kin Baishō 1-settai 100-man en (Keisanshō to 
Tōden chōsei) [Provisional Compensation of JPY 1 million per Household for Designated Evacuees (METI 
and TEPCO’s agreement)], Apr. 12, 2011 (on file with author). 
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tourism sector suffering reputational damage by association with 
“Fukushima.”40 
The Nuclear Compensation Law anticipates the establishment within 
MEXT of a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage 
Compensation to oversee resolution of disputes between operators and 
victims in the event of a nuclear accident.41  A committee was formed for the 
first time after the Tōkaimura accident in 1999, 42  and again after the 
Fukushima disaster in April 2011. 43   In response to the perceived 
inconsistent approaches taken in judicial decisions arising out of the 
Tōkaimura accident, the Nuclear Compensation Law was amended to 
provide the Dispute Reconciliation Committee with the power to issue non-
binding guidelines on the appropriate scope for compensation, in order to 
supplement the vague definition of “nuclear damage” under the law. 44  
Accordingly, the Fukushima Dispute Reconciliation Committee announced 
its Interim Guidelines on the Scope of Nuclear Damages from the Accident 
at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Plants on 5 August 2011.45  
Following the Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s announcement, TEPCO 
put in place a system to make “permanent” compensation payments, 
covering the gap between provisional payments and the full amount 
claimed.46  As of August 2013, some 673,000 applications for compensation 
had been received by TEPCO, of which TEPCO and claimants have reached 
an agreed compensation amount in 601,000 cases.47  Where TEPCO and 
claimants cannot reach agreement, or where claimants are otherwise 
                                                      
40  Heisei 23 nen Genshiryoku jiko niyoru higai ni kakaru kinkyūsochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law 
Relating to Emergency Facilities for the 2011 Nuclear Disaster], Law No. 91 of 2011 (Japan). 
41 Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 18 (Japan). 
42 Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō chōsei iinkai no setchi no tame no seirei [Cabinet Order for the 
Establishment of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation], Cabinet 
Order No. 332 of 1999 (Japan). 
43 Genshiryoku songai baishō funsō chōsei iinkai no setchi no tame no seirei [Cabinet Order for the 
Establishment of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation,] Cabinet 
Order No. 99 of 2011 (Japan). 
44  Nobuo Kojima, Fukushima dai-ichi genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko ni kan suru songai baishō to 
wore ni kanren suru sho-mondai [Damages Compensation for the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 
Plant Accident and Various Related Problems], 62 JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE], at 36 (2011) (on 
file with author). 
45 FUKUSHIMA DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM GUIDELINES ON THE SCOPE OF 
NUCLEAR DAMAGES FROM THE ACCIDENT AT THE TEPCO FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI AND DAI-NI PLANTS, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/index.htm. 
46 Press Release, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Permanent Compensation for Nuclear Damages 
by the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11083007-e.html. 
47 See Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage, 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf (excluding almost 1.3 million applications from 
voluntary evacuees, which are treated separately by TEPCO). 
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reluctant to approach TEPCO directly, they may refer the dispute to the 
Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation, a newly 
established alternative dispute resolution body. 48   In the alternative, 
claimants may pursue tort litigation on the basis of the Nuclear 
Compensation Law.49  
The Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s powers formally include the 
mediation of compensation-related disputes. 50   The Dispute Resolution 
Center was set up in August 2011 to assist in mediation between TEPCO 
and dissatisfied claimants, after it became clear that a larger and more 
sophisticated body would be required to handle the potentially large volume 
of disputes.51  Mediators, as well as investigators, who act as rapporteurs by 
gathering facts and refining issues of contention, are all lawyers seconded 
from the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, while the remainder of the 
Center’s staff is made up of secondees from the Ministry of Justice and 
MEXT. 52   Nevertheless, the requirement that mediators use the Interim 
Guidelines as a base for their settlement proposals,53 together with the fact 
that the Center sits under and is funded by MEXT (notwithstanding initial 
proposals—and the insistence of the Japanese legal profession—that the 
Center should be established outside of government), has led to criticisms 
that the Center is not sufficiently independent.54 
                                                      
48 DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, GUIDE TO THE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, (2011), 
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/07/10/1329118_001_1.
pdf. 
49 Nothing prevents claimants from bringing civil action against TEPCO in tandem with seeking 
mediation through the Dispute Resolution Center, or even after a completed settlement.  Indeed, it may be 
entirely rational to do so preemptively, given that the limitation period for actions in tort is 3 years and so 
will expire in March 2014.  See MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.], art. 724 (Japan). 
50 Genshiryoku songai no baishō ni kansuru hōritusu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, art. 18(2)(i) (Japan). 
51 Naoki Idei, Genpatsu jiko songai baishō seikyū to ADR no katsuyō: genshiryoku songai baishō 
funsō kaiketsu sentaa no katsudō wo chūshin to shite [The Use of ADR in Nuclear Accident Damages 
Compensation Claims: Centred on the Dispute Resolution Centre for Nuclear Damage Compensation], 63 
JIYŪ TO SEIGI [LIBERTY AND JUSTICE] at 72 (2012) (on file with author). 
52 See DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, GENSHIRYOKU 
SONGAI BAISHŌ FUNSŌ SENTAA KATSUDŌ JŌKYŌ HŌKOKUSHO – HEISEI 24-NEN NI OKERU JŌKYŌ NI TSUITE 
[REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
COMPENSATION—IN RESPECT OF ACTIVITIES FOR 2012] (2013), 
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/03/05/1329118_010.pd
f. 
53  Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation Mediation Rules, art. 21 (on file 
with author); see MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY – JAPAN, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329129.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) 
(in fact, mediators have expanded on the Interim Guidelines with a series of detailed standards of their 
own). 
54  Akimoto, supra note 36, at 25; Idei, supra note 51, at 72.  The Center arguably bears some of the 
characteristics of the governmental ADR bodies used as examples in Frank Upham’s classic work.  See 
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One of the challenges faced by the Center has been a degree of 
intransigence by TEPCO.  A number of disputes have arisen, for example, 
because of TEPCO’s unwillingness to compensate for items not specified 
under the Dispute Reconciliation Committee’s guidelines, notwithstanding 
the Committee’s intention that the guidelines should serve as a minimum 
only.55  The Center has taken a number of measures to discipline TEPCO in 
egregious cases, including awarding premiums to claimants in its settlement 
proposals, and “naming and shaming” TEPCO on the Center’s website.56 
 The dispute resolution system under the Center is not without its 
drawbacks for claimants.  Mediators were slow to resolve claims during the 
initial months of the Center’s operations,57 and the Center continues to have 
a large backlog of claims.58  However, timeframes are still considerably 
shorter than the average speed of court proceedings.59  Claims through the 
Center arguably provide a greater prospect of success than litigation, where 
the imbalance with TEPCO is starker for unrepresented litigants in 
particular.60  Indeed, in November 2011 TEPCO announced that it would 
abide by the Center’s settlement proposals.61  As a free service, it is also 
considerably cheaper.  It is unclear how many claims have been brought by 
                                                                                                                                                              
generally FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987).  Upham argues that 
these bodies were set up to “capture” disputes away from the judiciary, so as to prevent social movements 
coalescing around litigation and the courts ruling contrary to the preferences of the Japanese elite.  Through 
these ADR bodies, Upham argues, the bureaucracy can keep the resolution of disputes particularized, 
informal and opaque.  UPHAM at 16-27. 
55  Foote, supra note 13, at 16. 
56  See Tōkyō Denryoku Kabushiki Kaisha no Taiō ni Mondai no aru Kohyō ni tsuite [On Cases in 
which TEPCO’s Response has been Problematic], http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/ 
jikobaisho/detail/1329350.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).  
57  Foote, supra note 13, at 11. 
58  The Dispute Resolution Center has only disposed of 5065 of 7545 claims received to date.  See 
Dispute Resolution Ctr. for Nuclear Damage Comp., Wakai Chūkai Tetsudzuki no Jisshi Jōkyō 
[Enforcement Status of Settlement Mediation Procedures], http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho 
/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
59  On the basis that the Dispute Resolution Center aims to resolve all claims within four to five 
months, it averaged around eight months per case in 2012 (DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER FOR NUCLEAR 
DAMAGE COMPENSATION, supra note 52, at 1), as opposed to an average of 15.1 months for environmental 
pollution claims at the district court level.  See generally SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, Saiban no Jinsokuka 
ni kakawaru Kenshō Kekka no Kōhyō (Dai 5-kai) ni tsuite [On the Announcement of the 5th Verification 
of the Results of the Acceleration of Hearings] (2013), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/about/siryo/ 
hokoku_05_about /index.html.) 
60  Almost three-quarters of claimants do not have legal representation, which has contributed to 
delays in processing claims.  See Foote, supra note 13, at 11. 
61  Naoki Idei, The Nuclear Damage Claim Dispute Resolution Center, 28 Japan Commercial 
Arbitration Ass’n Newsletter, 1, 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/docs/newsletter28.pdf. 
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way of litigation, but the number would appear not to be large.62  In spite of 
its limitations, mediation through the Center appears to remain a more 
attractive option than litigation.   
 
C. Government Financial Assistance has Effectively Nationalized 
TEPCO 
Early on it became apparent that TEPCO would be unable to meet its 
potential liability above the insured amount of JPY 120 billion alone.  
TEPCO estimated its total liability at JPY 2.5 trillion,63 a figure that has 
since been revised up to more than JPY 3.8 trillion.64  Against this, the 
company’s net assets are worth no more than JPY 1.14 trillion. 65  
Accordingly, TEPCO requested government assistance pursuant to the 
Nuclear Compensation Law in May 2011.66 
The government’s response was the creation of the Nuclear Damage 
Liability Facilitation Fund. 67   The Fund is organized as a statutory 
corporation, with half of its units held by the government and the remaining 
half held by Japan’s twelve nuclear power operators, which are required to 
make annual contributions. 68   In return, the Fund can render financial 
assistance to any operator liable for compensation under the Nuclear 
Damages Act, including through the acquisition of an equity interest in the 
operator.69  Where the potential liability of the operator far exceeds the 
assets held by the Fund (as is naturally the case with the TEPCO payout), the 
Fund may request government assistance in the form of a special issue of 
government bonds. 70   Operators receiving financial assistance must 
formulate a “special business plan” together with the Fund, geared towards 
                                                      
62  Only two cases that reached judgment seem to have been reported.  See Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho 
[Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 29, 2011, Hei 23 (yo) no. 1099); Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 19 
2012, Hei 23 (wa) no. 19191 (Japan). 
63 TEPCO, ANNUAL REPORT 2012 1, 3 (2012), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/pdf/ 
ar2012-e.pdf. 
64  TEPCO, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 at 39 (2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/ 
pdf/ar2013-e.pdf. 
65  Id. at 21. 
66  NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT ECON. DAMAGE RESPONSE TEAM, TŌKYŌ DENRYOKU 
FUKUSHIMA GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI KAKAWARU GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO BAISHŌ NI KAN 
SURU SEIFU NO SHIEN NO WAKUGUMI NI TSUITE [ON THE FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN 
RELATION TO NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION FOR THE ACCIDENT AT THE TEPCO FUKUSHIMA 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] (2013), http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf 
/songaibaisho_110513_01.pdf. 
67  Genshiryoku songai baishō enkatsu-ka kikin-hō [Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund 
Law], Law No. 94 of 2011 (Japan). 
68  Id. at art. 38. 
69  Id. at art. 41. 
70  Id. at art. 48. 
JANUARY 2014 GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE 125 
 
swift payment of compensation to victims and repayment of the further 
assistance from the Fund through increased contributions.71  The relevant 
minister must approve of the business plan and can order the operator to 
produce reports and take appropriate measures for its duration.72 
The reason for the abstract wording of the law (referring to “operators” 
rather than TEPCO) and the reason that all nuclear power companies must 
contribute to the fund—notwithstanding that only TEPCO bears any liability 
from the Fukushima disaster—is that the Fund is intended to be a permanent 
body.73  In this sense the Fund is best regarded as an additional layer of 
insurance rather than a convoluted financing arrangement for TEPCO 
alone.74   
At the same time, the law establishing the Fund states that the 
government is to put in place full measures to ensure that the Fund can fulfill 
its objectives, in light of the government’s “social responsibility” in having 
promoted the use of nuclear power in Japan.75  This wording almost appears 
designed to eschew any question of legal responsibility. 
TEPCO submitted its business plan and request for financial 
assistance from the Fund in October 2011 and received approval in 
November 2011.76  The company has made nineteen requests for assistance 
to date77 and has issued new shares to the Fund such that the Fund now holds 
54.69% of the shares in TEPCO.78  TEPCO has, therefore, in effect been 
nationalized under the pretense of financial assistance. 
 
III. CONTRAST: ASBESTOS COMPENSATION IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
TEPCO has reached a settled agreement in just over 600,000 of the 
673,000 of the claims brought by victims of the Fukushima disaster to 
                                                      
71  Id. at art. 45. 
72  Id. at art. 47. 
73  Aribayashi, supra note 12, at 38. 
74  Although Morita argues that it is better understood as a loss-sharing scheme.  See Morita, supra 
note 15, at 8. 
75  Genshiryoku songai baishō enkatsu-ka kikin-hō [Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund 
Law], Law No. 94 of 2011, art. 2 (Japan).  This wording comes from a cabinet resolution–Tōkyōdenryoku 
Fukushima genshiryokuhatsudenshojiko ni kansuru genshiryoku songai baishō ni kanren suru seifu no 
shien taisei ni tsuite [Regarding the Government Support Structure in relation to Nuclear Damages in 
respect of the Accident at the Tokyo Electric Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant]. 
76 Press Release, TEPCO, Approval of the Special Business Plan (Nov. 4, 2011),  
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11110403-e.html. 
77 Press Release, TEPCO, Financial Support from the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/2013/1229905_5130.html. 
78  See Corporate Information, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/stock/stock-e.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2013).  The Tokyo Metropolitan Government holds a further 1.2% of shares in TEPCO.  
Id. 
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date.79  If TEPCO is unable to settle in even a small proportion of those 
outstanding claims, prompting claimants to instead turn to civil litigation for 
redress, the burden on the court system could be tremendous.  Consequently, 
there are incentives for the creation of an alternative dispute resolution 
model to alleviate this burden. 
Government-sponsored mediation is a common form of ADR in 
Japan.80  However, other models of ADR are also available.  One such 
example is the NSW Dust Diseases Tribunal (“DDT”), which hears claims 
in respect of diseases caused by environmental exposure to asbestos and 
other silicates.81 
The number of such claims against a small number of Australian 
asbestos manufacturers has gradually risen in Australia since the use and 
manufacture of asbestos products was steadily phased out in the 1980s.82  
Indeed, as a proportion of population, the number of claims now heard by 
the DDT on an annual basis is comparable with those dealt with by the 
Japanese Dispute Resolution Center for Nuclear Damage Compensation.  As 
of August 2013, the Dispute Resolution Center had received a total of 7,545 
claims since its establishment in 2011, of which 3,896 had been settled.83  In 
2012 alone, the DDT, covering a jurisdiction with a population only five 
percent that of Japan, received 451 claims and finalized 357.84 
 
A. Asbestos Exposure Rates in NSW are Among the Highest in the World 
Governments in Australia as elsewhere were aware of the health 
hazards associated with asbestos by the middle of the 20th century.85  Yet in 
NSW asbestos was mined until 1979,86 while products containing amphibole 
                                                      
79  Records of Applications and Payouts for Indemnification of Nuclear Damage, TEPCO,  
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/comp/images/jisseki-e.pdf . 
80  See Foote, supra note 13, at 1-4; see generally UPHAM, supra note 54. 
81  See DUST DISEASES TRIBUNAL, http://www.dustdiseasestribunal.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2013). 
82  The first successful common law damages claims for asbestos-related diseases were made in the 
late 1980s.  See Pilmer v McPhersons Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gobbo J, Sept. 1985) 
(Austl.); Barrow & Heys v CSR Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Rowland J, Aug. 4, 
1988) (Austl.).   
83 See MINISTRY OF EDUC., CULTURE, SPORTS, SCI. AND TECH. – JAPAN, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/genshi_baisho/jiko_baisho/detail/1329118.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
84  E-mail from Stephanie Chia, Registry Manager, Dust Diseases Tribunal, to author (Jan. 31, 2013) 
(on file with author).  
85  The Division of Industrial Hygiene within the NSW Department of Health, for example, reported 
on the risks of asbestos exposure in 1927, 1938, and 1948.  See Amaca Pty Ltd. (formerly known as James 
Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd.) v New South Wales & Anor [2004] NSWCA 124, 83 (Austl.). 
86  The state’s sole asbestos mine in Baryulgil, northern NSW, which was operated by the James 
Hardie Group, was closed in April 1979.  See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON 
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asbestos were manufactured until the late 1980s.87  Sales of asbestos were 
not outlawed altogether until 2004.88  This represents a gap of some several 
decades during which Australian governments could have regulated to 
prohibit or restrict the use of asbestos, potentially saving lives. 
Mass tort cases for asbestos exposure-related disease are certainly not 
unique to Australia.  However, Australia was historically the highest user per 
capita of asbestos products, and rates of mesothelioma and other asbestos-
related diseases are higher in Australia than in any other country—most of 
these within the state of NSW.89  It is estimated, for example, that there will 
be a total of 18,000 cases of mesothelioma in NSW by 2020.90 
Workers’ compensation claims for inhalation have been handled for 
several decades outside of the NSW courts by the Dust Diseases Board, a 
statutory no-fault compensation body for occupational diseases caused by all 
forms of silicates.91  However, an increasing number of negligence claims 
relate to long-term environmental exposure, such as through asbestos-lined 
concrete used in commercial and residential buildings, and therefore fall 
outside of the Dust Diseases Board’s jurisdiction.92 
 
B. The Dust Diseases Tribunal is an Independent Specialist Court 
In 1989 the NSW government recognized the need to create a more 
streamlined process for handling such claims, as many claimants were dying 
from disease before judgment could be reached in the state Supreme Court.93  
In response, the government created a specialist court in the form of the 
DDT,94 which began hearing its first cases within the year.95 
Although nominally a tribunal, the DDT is a court of record, meaning 
that its proceedings are open to the public, governed by the NSW Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules, and that its judgments form part of the common 
                                                                                                                                                              
ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS MINING ON THE BARYULGIL COMMUNITY 
(1984). 
87  CANCER INST. OF NSW, MESOTHELIOMA IN NEW SOUTH WALES 1, 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.cancerinstitute.org.au/media/27422/2010-9-22_monograph_mesothelioma_in_nsw.pdf. 
88  Id.  Specifically, the sale of all remaining products using chrysotile asbestos was prohibited. 
89  O’Meally, supra note 20, at 1209-10. 
90  Id. at 1210. 
91  Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Act 1942 (NSW) 14 (Austl.). 
92  See Lee C. Moerman & Sandra van der Laan, James Hardie & the Final Funding Agreement 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Sydney). 
93  O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1211-12. 
94  See Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) 63 (Austl.). 
95   O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1212. 
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law.96  All cases must be heard before a qualified District or Supreme Court 
judge, who has the same powers of contempt as in the Supreme Court.97  
Accordingly, and unlike the Dispute Resolution Center, the DDT enjoys the 
same degree of independence as the ordinary courts. 
However, due to the need to process claims quickly, the DDT has 
been provided with a procedural flexibility that is unique within the NSW 
judiciary.  For example, the DDT can sit at any hour on any day, anywhere 
in or outside of Australia, and often does so at the bedsides of terminally ill 
patients.98  The DDT’s record for hearing a claim is only four hours between 
filing and judgment,99 although the average is naturally longer.  Some rules 
ordinarily applicable to tort claims, such as the general law limitation period, 
are also not applicable to those before the DDT.100 
The DDT has played an important role in keeping claims out of the 
ordinary courts.  However, its structure is very different from the Dispute 
Resolution Center. 
It is difficult to see any legal or constitutional barriers in Japan to 
establishing a specialized, informal court capable of dealing with claims 
quickly, like the DDT.  The need to establish a body within a short 
timeframe is no answer, as the DDT was set up in essentially the same 
period of time as the Dispute Resolution Center.  Nor is the fact that the 
need for alternative dispute resolution is temporary.  Since asbestos 
production was effectively stopped several decades ago in Australia, the 
DDT is also, by definition, a temporary dispute resolution body.  Given that 
TEPCO has received more than half of a million claims so far, it is fair to 
assume that it will take many years to finalize all disputes.  The desire to 
limit the independence of the mediator, and to maximize influence over 
TEPCO, may be one reason for the delay. 
It is worth noting that Japan’s own response to increasing asbestos 
litigation has again been to co-opt the claims process.101  Whereas in Japan, 
too, laborers in asbestos-intensive industries have been eligible for workers’ 
compensation payments for some time.  In 2006, the Diet passed the Law on 
                                                      
96  Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, supra note 94, at pt. 2, ss. 4; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005 (NSW), sch 1 (Austl.). 
97  Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 , supra note 94, at ss 7, 10 (Austl.). 
98  O'Meally, supra note 20, at 1215. 
99  Id. 
100 The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW), which sets a general limitation period of six years in respect of 
actions in tort, does not apply to proceedings that are brought before the DDT.  See supra note 94, at s 12A. 
101  In respect of asbestos litigation in Japan generally, see Eri Osaka, Asbestos Regulations and 
Litigations in Japan: Recent Development and the Prospects for the Future (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript); Luke Nottage, The ABCs of Product Safety Re-regulation in Japan: Asbestos, Buildings, 
Consumer Electrical Goods, and Schindler's Lifts, 15 GRIFFITH L. REV. 242 (2006). 
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Relief for Health Damages from Asbestos, applicable to sufferers of 
asbestos-related diseases caused by environmental exposure.102  Under this 
law the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency administers a 
no-fault compensation scheme, funded in part by industry, from which 
standardized payments are made to any certified sufferer of an asbestos-
related disease or their families.103  It is again arguable that the government 
is in part seeking to avoid potential claims where would-be defendants (such 
as manufacturers of asbestos products) have become insolvent or cannot be 
identified.  In the same year that this law was passed, a well-publicized class 
action suit was brought against the national government for failing to control 
working conditions in, and emissions from, an asbestos factory in Sennan, 
Osaka Prefecture.104 
 
C. Defendant Funding Arrangements have been at Arm’s Length 
In a significant proportion of cases brought before the DDT, 
companies in the James Hardie group, which held a near monopoly on the 
manufacture of asbestos products in Australia for most of the twentieth 
century, were among a very small number of defendants.105  Like TEPCO, 
therefore, James Hardie as defendant stood as the principal shield against a 
large volume of claims directly against the government. 
As the number of claims mounted over the 1980s and 1990s, James 
Hardie sought to distance its profit-making activities from its tort liabilities.  
In 2001 the group established a trust in NSW to administer asbestos 
compensation claims, while at the same time shifting the James Hardie 
holding company and most of the group’s assets offshore, with the consent 
of the state Supreme Court.106  In 2004 a critical judicial enquiry into James 
Hardie’s corporate reorganization found the trust to be significantly 
underfunded, in breach of its representations to the Supreme Court.107  James 
Hardie negotiated with the NSW government, trade unions, and victims’ 
groups, finally agreeing to establish a new trust—the Asbestos Injuries 
                                                      
102 Ishiwata ni yoru kenkō higai no kyūsai ni kan suru hōritsu [Operation of the Asbestos Health 
Hazard Relief Benefits, Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan], Law No. 4 of 2006 
(Japan). 
103  ENV’T RESTORATION & CONSERVATION AGENCY OF JAPAN, OPERATION OF THE ASBESTOS 
HEALTH HAZARD RELIEF BENEFITS, http://www.erca.go.jp/asbestos/relief/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
104  The Osaka District Court found against the government and awarded plaintiffs JPY 435 million, 
although this was reversed by the Osaka High Court on appeal.  See Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High 
Ct.] Aug. 25, 2011, Hei 23 (ne) no. 2031 (Japan). 
105  Moerman & van der Laan, supra note 92. 
106  See generally Dunn, supra note 21. 
107  Id. 
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Compensation Fund (“AICF”)—paid for by 35% of James Hardie’s annual 
cash flow.108  Under the agreement, the NSW government has the right to 
appoint only a minority of directors to the board of the trustee.109 
Following the global financial crisis and the consequent slump in 
James Hardie’s building product sales, the government put in place a 
standby loan facility for the AICF worth AUD 320 million, in exchange for 
which the government received security over certain of the AICF’s assets.110  
The loan facility agreement gives the government no control over the 
operations of either the AICF or James Hardie.111 
It is true that in one sense the NSW government could not have hoped 
to impose stricter conditions on the AICF’s funding, given that most of 
James Hardie’s assets were already offshore.  However, given that it took 
the NSW government several decades to concern itself with James Hardie’s 
funding arrangements, and that it made no move to prevent the group’s 
move offshore, it is arguable that the government would not have attempted 
to intervene any further even if it had been possible to do so. 
It is again difficult to see why the Japanese government could not 
have similarly entered into an arm’s length financing arrangement of this 
nature with TEPCO.  Given that TEPCO has a statutory monopoly over the 
provision of electricity around the capital,112  the likelihood of default is 
certainly far less than that of James Hardie, the fortunes of which are tied to 
the global building industry, and which has anyway moved most of its assets 
outside of Australia.  The TEPCO funding arrangements seem instead to be 
designed to maximize the government’s influence over TEPCO and other 
plant operators, both by allowing the government to mandate operator 
contributions and by using the provision of finance to give the government 
considerable leverage over TEPCO’s operations.   
 
IV. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE IN JAPAN 
 
The Japanese government’s concern to maintain control over the 
dispute resolution process, and over TEPCO, through its funding 
                                                      
108  ASBESTOS INJURIES COMP. FUND, AMENDED AND RESTATED FINAL FUNDING AGREEMENT, 
http://www.aicf.org.au/key_docs.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
109 Id. at 50-51 (clauses 5.1 and 5.2 outline the composition of the Trustee Board and the power to 
appoint directors respectively). 
110  Parliament of New South Wales, AICF Facility Agreement (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/la/latabdoc.nsf/0/15e23dae847b31bdca2578010021ac7c/$FILE/(a)
%20AICF%20facility%20agreement.pdf; see also James Hardie Former Subsidiaries (Winding Up and 
Administration) Act 2005 (NSW) 105 (Austl.). 
111  Parliament of New South Wales, supra note 110. 
112  Denki jigyō hō [The Electricity Utilities Industry Law], Law No. 170 of 1964 (Japan).  
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arrangements, can perhaps be explained by the potential for the government 
to bear direct liability for the disaster. 
 
A. The State Compensation Act is the Basis for Government Liability in 
Regulatory Failure Cases 
While the Japanese government cannot bear any direct liability for 
compensation of victims of the Fukushima disaster under the Nuclear 
Compensation Law, it may nevertheless be possible for victims to bring 
claims against the government on the basis of the State Compensation Law, 
which makes special provisions for the tort liability of public authorities.113  
The operator-centered liability principle of the Nuclear Compensation Law 
arguably cannot preclude claims under the State Compensation Law (cf. the 
Civil Code), as this would potentially be unconstitutional.114  The question is 
therefore on what grounds a claim under the State Compensation Law is 
possible. 
Article 1(1) of the State Compensation Law provides that:  “[w]here 
an officer exercising the public functions of the State or of a public authority 
has, in the course of their duties, unlawfully inflicted damage upon another 
person whether intentionally or negligently, the State or public authority 
shall be liable for compensation.”115 
As under the general tort provision of the Civil Code,116 there is no 
separate cause of action for negligence.  All “unlawful” conduct occasioning 
damage—whether negligent or intentional—falls under the heading of 
“tortious conduct” (fuhō kōi).117  “Unlawfulness” (ihōsei) equates broadly 
with the infringement of rights and legally protected interests.118  Whereas in 
cases under the Civil Code damage itself is usually determinative of 
                                                      
113  Kokka baishō-hō/kokka wa hōritsu o zesei [State Compensation Law/State Redress Law], Law 
No. 125 of 1947 (Japan).  
114  It would be inconsistent with Article 17 of the Constitution, which provides citizens a right to sue 
for illegal acts by public officials.  See Tadashi Ōotsuka, Fukushima dai-ichi genpatsu jiko ni yoru songai 
baishō to baishō shien kikō hō: fuhō kōi hōgaku no kanten kara [Damages Compensation for the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident and the Compensation Facilitation Fund Law: From a 
Torts Law Perspective], JURISUTO, at 40 (2011). 
115  Kokka baishō-hō/kokka wa hōritsu o zesei [State Compensation Law/State Redress Law], Law 
No. 125 of 1947 (Japan).  This is the author’s personal translation of the State Compensation Law/State 
Redress Law.  An alternative translation of the law in full is available online on the Japanese Law 
Translation website, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp, where the law is referred to as the “State 
Redress Law.” 
116  MINPŌ [MINPŌ ] [CIV. C.] art. 709 (Japan). 
117  Id. 
118  RYŌICHI YOSHIMURA, FUHŌ KŌI [TORT LAW] 39-42 (Yūhikaku ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
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unlawfulness,119 under the State Compensation Law the infliction of damage 
must be unlawful within the context of the public (i.e., regulatory) function 
contemplated. 120   As many functions are premised upon the deliberate 
infringement of rights and interests for the public benefit, something more is 
required.  Unlawfulness is therefore determined in light of the underlying 
statute in accordance with which the relevant function was exercised, as well 
as any applicable procedural or organizational rules.121  The exercise of the 
function need not necessarily be invalid for administrative law purposes, 
although a prior judgment of invalidity will be persuasive.122 
 
B. Japanese Courts have Increasingly Recognized Liability in Regulatory 
Failure Cases 
Several omissions on the part of government agencies have been 
pointed to as possible grounds for liability with respect to the Fukushima 
disaster.  The Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) failed, for example, to 
keep its Inspection Guidelines for Seismic Design for Nuclear Power 
Facilities up-to-date with new knowledge on the scale of past seismic 
activity in the Tohoku region. 123   According to the Diet’s Independent 
Commission Report, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (“NISA”) 
accepted at face value calculations by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers 
as to the maximum height of any possible tsunami, and TEPCO’s own 
calculations as to the probability of a tsunami reaching the Fukushima Dai-
ichi plant, without conducting independent analysis.124  While inspection 
guidelines are not binding on operators, the NSC also failed to exercise its 
rule-making functions to mandate severe accident countermeasures for 
natural disasters in line with international trends.125  The NSC, moreover, 
failed to make any provision under its disaster prevention guidelines for 
multiple disasters (such as a station blackout following an earthquake or 
                                                      
119  Indeed, Article 709 does not use the term “unlawful,” although it is widely used in tort law 
jurisprudence. 
120  HIDETAKE SATŌ, JITSUMU HANREI: CHIKUJŌ KOKKA BAISHŌ HŌ [PRACTICAL CASE LAW: 
ANNOTATED STATE COMPENSATION LAW] 53 (Sankyō Hōki, 2008). 
121  Id. at 57. 
122  Id. at 60. 
123  Hitomi, supra note 36, at 23.  See Noboru Utatsu, Genshiryoku songai baishō hō ni okeru sekinin 
shūchū gensoku to kokka hoshō [The Concentrated Liability Principle Under the Nuclear Damage 
Compensation Law and State Compensation], 74 SONGAI HOKEN KENKYŪ (2012) for a detailed analysis of 
faults in other NSC guidelines (on file with author). 
124  FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 27. 
125  INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM'N ON THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, supra note 5, at 279. 
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tsunami that disrupts access to the site), regarding the probability of multiple 
disasters occurring as “extremely low.”126 
Even on the basis of the existing inspection guidelines, regulators’ 
oversight appears to have been lax.  After revising the Seismic Design 
Guidelines in 2006, NISA and METI chose the softer option of requiring 
operators with existing facilities to conduct “backchecks” (safety 
assessments) rather than ordering “backfits” (upgrading of facilities in 
accordance with specified technical standards). 127   Given the age of the 
Numbers one through four reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi, both TEPCO and 
NISA were aware that existing safety facilities could not meet the 2006 
standards.128  Nevertheless, after submitting only partial interim reports in 
2008 and 2009, TEPCO repeatedly delayed submitting its final backcheck 
report.129  NISA neither required TEPCO to produce its final report earlier 
nor ordered it to carry out reinforcement of the Numbers one through four 
reactors.130 
The State Compensation Law does not explicitly refer to omissions, 
and the Japanese courts were traditionally reluctant to recognize the 
unlawfulness of a failure to exercise a regulatory function—as opposed to 
the negligent or improper use of a function—due to concern about 
interfering with administrative discretion.  As a general principle of tort law, 
liability for an omission can only arise where there was a positive duty to act.  
In the context of the State Compensation Law, courts have more readily 
recognized such a positive duty on the part of a public authority to exercise 
non-discretionary regulatory functions131 but have been hesitant to do so 
when the function is discretionary, 132  such as the NSC’s rule-making 
functions. 
Since the 1970s, however, lower courts have increasingly ruled 
against the government in cases of regulatory failure for discretionary 
functions also.133  For example, from the 1970s to the 1980s, several district 
courts found that the Ministry of Health’s failure to withdraw marketing 
                                                      
126  Id. at 286-87. 
127  See Utatsu, supra note 123 (providing a detailed analysis of the regulatory basis). 
128 FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 27. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Claims in such cases are arguably closer to the common law cause of action for breach of statutory 
duty than negligence. 
132 See generally Ryō Futagoishi & Kazutaka Suzuki, Kisei kengen no fukōshi wo meguru kokka 
baishō hō jo no sho-mondai ni tsuite [Various Issues Under the State Compensation Law Surrounding Non-
Exercise of Regulatory Functions] HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA], at 7 (2011) (on file with author). 
133  For a comprehensive list of all reported cases dealing with regulatory failure, see Akira Nishino, 
Kokka baishō hō komentaaru [State Compensation Law Commentary] KEISŌ SHOBŌ, at 202-205 (2012) 
(on file with author). 
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approvals for stomach medication linked with SMON disorder was 
unlawful.134 
The Supreme Court has considered liability for regulatory failure in 
four principal cases and found against the government in two of them.  Each 
case involved regulatory functions with some degree of discretion:  two with 
respect to ordinary licensing functions, 135  and two with respect to rule-
making functions over matters of health and safety.136  Although none of 
these tests have evinced a clear criterion for unlawfulness, each has 
employed something close to the main test for invalidity of discretionary 
functions under ordinary administrative law, 137  considering whether the 
relevant regulatory failure “significantly lacked reasonableness” in light of 
the purpose of the function granted or the nature of the function.138  If so, the 
failure to regulate will exceed the bounds of the discretion, effectively 
giving rise to a positive duty to exercise the function. 
In comparison with the wealth of lower court regulatory failure cases 
relating to, for example, consumer products,139 there is no past precedent 
with respect to nuclear damage, including among the Tōkaimura litigation, 
which was directed solely at the nuclear operator.  In 2011 a group of 
TEPCO shareholders sought to recover their losses from the fall in TEPCO’s 
share price against the government, arguing that the government and not 
TEPCO was responsible for the Fukushima disaster by promoting nuclear 
                                                      
134 Id. at 202. 
135  See Real Estate Law Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 24, 1989, no. 43(10), SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1169, 1337 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 48 (Japan); Chloroquine Medical 
Harm Case, Supreme Court Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 23, 1995, 49(6) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1600, 1539 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 32 (Japan). 
136 See Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] April 27, 2004, 58(4) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1032, 1152 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 120 (Japan); Kansai 
Minamata Disease Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 15, 2004, 58(7) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1802, 1167 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 89 (Japan).  For concise summaries of each 
of these and the previous two cases, see KATSUYA UGA ET AL., GYŌSEI HANREI HYAKUSEN II [100 SELECT 
CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, VOL II] (Yūhikaku ed., 6th ed. 2012). 
137 See, e.g., The MacLean Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 1978, 32(7) SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1223 (stating that an administrative disposition will be illegal where “the agency’s 
reasoning had absolutely no basis in fact, or their appreciation of the facts demonstrated a clear lack of 
rationality, such that it is obvious that the decision significantly lacked reasonableness in light of social 
norms”) (the author’s translation and emphasis). 
138 See Real Estate Law Case, 1337 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 48, 50; Chloroquine Medical Harm Case, 
1539 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 32, 37; Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, 1152 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 120, 
127; Kansai Minamata Disease Case, 1167 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA]89, 97. 
139 See, e.g., a number of recent judgments in respect of government approval of the Iressa anti-cancer 
drug, the side effects of which led to the premature deaths of a number of patients:  Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho 
[Tokyo High Ct.] Nov. 15, 2011, 2131 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 35; Osaka Kōtō Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] 
May 25, 2004, Hei 23 (ne) no. 1674 (Japan).  A number of actions were also brought against the drug’s 
manufacturer, AstraZeneca PLC, under Nihon no seizōbutsusekininhō [Japan’s Product Liability Law], 
Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). 
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power without setting down sufficient disaster standards, and that it failed to 
adequately consider whether the exception to liability under the Nuclear 
Compensation Law could apply.140  However, this case appears to have been 
filed before the publication of the Independent Commission Report, and in a 
terse judgment, the Tokyo District Court found simply that the basis upon 
which government liability was claimed was unclear and could not be 
upheld.141  Whether, in the light of the various reports’ findings, any of the 
above omissions could be said to “significantly lack reasonableness” is 
therefore an open question.  The two cases in which the Supreme Court has 
previously found liability on the part of the government may offer some 
guidance. 
 
C. Case Studies: The Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai 
Minamata Disease Case 
This part examines two cases where the Supreme Court found an 
omission to exercise a regulatory function unlawful:  the Chikuhō 
Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai Minamata Disease Case.   
1. The Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case 
The first case in which the Supreme Court found an omission to 
exercise a regulatory function unlawful was the Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis 
Case.142  There, former miners at major (but now defunct) coal mines in 
Chikuhō, Fukuoka Prefecture, brought suits against the national government 
for failing to exercise regulatory functions under the Mine Safety Law143 so 
as to prevent them from developing coal workers’ pneumoconiosis 
(colloquially known as “black lung”), a type of respiratory disease similar to 
asbestosis. 144   Specifically, they argued that the relevant minister had 
sufficient knowledge of the risks of exposure to coal dust at the time that the 
preventative Pneumoconiosis Law145 came into force in 1960.  However, the 
minister failed to exercise his powers under the Mine Safety Law to amend 
existing ministerial ordinances to mandate suitable abatement techniques or 
to exercise adequate safety supervision of mines.146  Abatement techniques 
                                                      
140 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Apr. 25, 2012, Hei 23 (wa) no. 13288 (Japan).   
141  Id.  That the plaintiffs also argued that their constitutional rights had been infringed suggests that 
they were somewhat grasping at straws. 
142  Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, 1152 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 120, at 123 (Japan). 
143  Kōzan hoan-hō [Mine Safety Law], Law No. 70 of 1949 (Japan).  
144 Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, supra note 142, at 123-24. 
145 Jinpai-hō [Pneumoconiosis Law], Law No. 30 of 1960 (Japan). 
146  Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case, supra note 142, at 126. 
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such as the use of water flushing rock drills had been mandatory in Japanese 
gold mines since 1952 but were resisted in coal mining, it was argued, 
because of the importance of cheap coal for the country’s economic 
policy.147 
The Supreme Court found that such a failure was contrary to the 
purpose of the Mine Safety Law—to safeguard the health and safety of 
miners—and therefore “significantly lacked reasonableness,” rendering it 
unlawful.148  Although not explicitly applying the discretion reduction theory, 
the Supreme Court found relevant as part of the “general considerations” 
surrounding the failure to regulate that the risk to health was foreseeable and 
could have been avoided by exercise of the function.149 
 
2. The Kansai Minamata Disease Case 
In the Kansai Minamata Disease Case, decided only a few months 
after the Chikuhō case, the Supreme Court again found a minister liable for 
failing to intervene earlier to minimize the effects of Minamata disease in 
Minamata Bay, Kumamoto Prefecture.150  By the late 1950s it was widely 
suspected that poisonous mercury compounds released from a local plant of 
Chisso, a chemical manufacturer, and ingested via fish caught in the bay, 
were responsible for the outbreak of the disease. 151   However, the 
government delayed taking action for more than a decade before finally 
regulating emissions into Minamata Bay.152  In this case, the Supreme Court 
found that even if the Minister did not have actual knowledge of the source 
of the poisonous mercury compounds in the 1950s, the source could have 
been discovered if a more thorough investigation had been made, and the 
number of disease sufferers minimized if the appropriate functions under 
relevant water safety laws had been exercised to prohibit further releases of 
mercury.153   
The Court found that the failures both to carry out this investigation 
and consequently to take appropriate regulatory measures from the point at 
which the hypothetical investigation could have occurred again 
                                                      
147  Id. at 124. 
148  Id. at 127. 
149  Id. at 126-27. 
150  See  UPHAM, supra note 54 (providing a detailed overview of the Minamata Bay disaster, 
including of earlier mass tort litigation against Chisso). 
151  Id. at 31. 
152  MINISTRY OF THE ENV’T ENVTL HEALTH DEP’T, MINAMATA DISEASE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEASURES (2002), http://www.env.go.jp/en/chemi/hs/minamata2002/. 
153  UPHAM, supra note 54. 
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“significantly lacked reasonableness” and were unlawful.154  So too was the 
failure of the Kumamoto prefectural government to take equivalent action 
under the prefectural Fisheries Ordinance, 155  notwithstanding that the 
prefecture had fewer resources than the national government and that the 
relevant ordinance was not directly related to industrial pollution.156  Again, 
the court stressed foreseeability and avoidability as part of the “general 
considerations” leading to unlawfulness.157  
 
3. Analyzing the Chikuhō Pneumoconiosis Case and the Kansai 
Minamata Disease Case 
The Chikuhō and Minamata Disease cases appear to suggest that 
failure to exercise discretionary regulatory functions will “significantly lack 
reasonableness” where 1) there is a risk of significant harm, 2) the 
government is aware or should be aware of the risk of harm, and 3) it is 
within the government’s power to prevent harm by exercising its regulatory 
function.   
To some extent, all three conditions are met by the facts of the 
Fukushima disaster.  As noted above, the independent commissions’ reports 
found that the NSC and NISA could have kept themselves informed of the 
potential for a tsunami the size of that which struck the Fukushima plant if 
they had sought independent advice.  At the very least, NISA was aware that 
the Fukushima plant did not meet the NSC’s existing (out-of-date) standards.  
It was certainly within the power of the NSC to issue more stringent 
standards or of NISA to enforce backfits of the Fukushima plant, although 
there are genuine causal questions as to whether either alone could have 
prevented the disaster. 
Other factors may also point to potential liability.  One common 
observation is that courts are more likely to find that a failure to regulate was 
significantly unreasonable and hence unlawful where the interest affected 
was personal safety or health rather than property.158  Thus the Supreme 
Court found against the government in the Chikuhō and Minamata Disease 
cases, but not in the Real Estate Law case, where a defrauded property buyer 
sought to claim against a local government for failing to prevent his loss by 
                                                      
154  Id.  
155  Kumamoto ken jōrei [Kumamoto Prefectural Ordinance], no. 31 of 1951 (Japan). 
156  See UPHAM, supra note 54 (providing a detailed overview of the Minamata Bay disaster, including 
of earlier mass tort litigation against Chisso). 
157  Id. 
158  See Futagoishi & Suzuki, supra note 132, at 22; Nishino, supra note 133, at 207. 
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withdrawing the registration of the defrauding realtor. 159   While any 
litigation arising from the Fukushima disaster would presumably relate 
mainly to property damage, the potential, if not actual, harm from radiation 
that could have occurred may push the government’s inadequate oversight of 
TEPCO into the same category. 
It can also be observed that in both the Chikuhō and Minamata 
Disease cases, the government had actively sided with the primary 
tortfeasors—coal mining companies in the Chikuhō case, and Chisso in the 
Minamata Disease case—to avoid imposing an economic burden on them.  
This no doubt also informed the court’s finding as to the reasonableness of 
the decision not to regulate.  As noted above, in the case of TEPCO, too, the 
independent investigation commissions were critical of government 
regulators for falling captive to industry and for failing to exercise 
independence in setting or enforcing seismic safety standards. 
On the other hand, one significant issue raised by the Fukushima 
accident, which to date has not been resolved by the Supreme Court, is the 
relationship between the scope of intended beneficiaries of a given public 
function and the existence of a positive duty to exercise it.  While some 
functions relate to only a narrow class of parties, the scope of others—
particularly broad rule-making functions, such as those exercised by NISA 
and the NSC—are quite wide. 
Some lower courts have sought to resolve this question by borrowing 
from administrative law the “reflexive interest principle” (hanshateki rieki 
ron) of standing.  Under this modified principle, the failure to exercise a 
function will not be unlawful unless plaintiffs can demonstrate a legal right 
that an authority is bound to protect in light of the objectives for which the 
function is granted, and not simply a “reflexive” interest as an ordinary 
member of the public.160  Where the scope of potential beneficiaries is broad, 
it is less likely that an individualized right will be made out. 
The Supreme Court has not made its position clear.  Although not 
explicitly referred to, the reflexive interest principle appears to have been 
relevant to the decision in the Real Estate Law case.161  The Supreme Court 
held that the purpose of registration of realtors under the Real Estate Law 
was not to protect every individual party to a real estate transaction from loss, 
and therefore the failure to protect could not be unlawful.162 
                                                      
159  Real Estate Law Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 24, 1989, no. 43(10), SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1169, 1337 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 48 (Japan). 
160  See Nishino, supra note 133, at 208-09. 
161  See Real Estate Law case, supra note 159. 
162  Id. 
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However, the use of the reflexive interest in State Compensation Law 
cases has been widely criticized,163 and the principle does not appear to have 
been referred to at all in either the Chikuhō or Minamata Disease cases.  In 
any event, in the Monju Reactor Case, an administrative law case in which 
local residents sought to void the construction permission for the Monju 
reactor in Fukui Prefecture, the reflexive interest principle was considered 
and found not to act as a bar to bringing suit.164 
 
V. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR REGULATORY FAILURE: A COMMON LAW 
COMPARISON 
Compared to the response of the Japanese government to the 
Fukushima disaster, the less interventionist response of the NSW 
government to mounting asbestos claims may relate to the potential for the 
government to be held directly liable for failure to adequately regulate the 
use and sale of asbestos products.  In contrast with the Japanese position 
described above, courts in Australia, as in other common law countries, have 
been reluctant to impose liability for the exercise or non-exercise of 
discretionary regulatory functions (as opposed to private law functions).  
Again, this is not to suggest that common law governments never take a 
stronger hand in responding to mass tort situations.  However, their own 
potential liability need not act as a determining factor. 
A. The Common Law Position Makes it Difficult to Establish a Duty of 
Care 
Unlike Japan, most common law jurisdictions do not have a separate 
body of law governing state liability in negligence.165  Indeed, the starting 
point at common law is total sovereign immunity from tort liability, 
although this has been largely waived by statute in most jurisdictions.166  To 
this extent, in theory the ordinary common law tort rules apply to public 
authorities, consistent with the Diceyan view of the rule of law, where the 
State stands on equal footing to ordinary members of the public before the 
                                                      
163  Futagoishi & Suzuki, supra note 132, at 13-14. 
164  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 22, 1992, 46(6) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
571 (Japan). 
165  It is worth noting that similar factual circumstances to the Fukushima disaster in common law 
countries could give rise to a claim of nuisance, insofar as residents surrounding the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
Plant have been deprived of enjoyment of their property through forced evacuation.  However, only the 
rules for negligence are considered here. 
166  See, e.g., Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s. 64 (Austl.); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2013). 
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courts.167  In practice, however, the courts have tended to apply a higher 
threshold in determining the existence of a duty of care towards members of 
the public.  The different approaches of courts in the United States, England 
and Australia vary to some degree and are considered in turn below. 
 
1. The Anglo-American Approach: “Planning” vs. “Operational” 
Decisions  
Courts in both the United States and England have focused on the 
character of the regulatory function in question when determining the 
existence of a duty of care.  In the United States, state liability for torts is 
primarily governed by statute, particularly the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”), which provides a right of action for any negligent or wrongful act 
or omission by an employee of the federal government where a private 
person would be liable for the same conduct.168  This broad right is qualified 
by several exceptions including, most importantly, the “discretionary 
function exception,” which excludes liability for: 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a 
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation 
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty 
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.169  
 
The discretionary function exception thus can limit the government’s 
liability in many instances.   
In the early case of Dalehite v. United States,170 the Supreme Court 
drew a distinction between functions at the “planning” level of 
administrative activity, which tend to be highly discretionary in nature and 
so are automatically immune, and functions at the “operational” level, which 
are not.171  The Supreme Court later clarified that the administrative level at 
which decisions are made will not alone be determinative of the operation of 
the exception, focusing its attention on the discretionary character of the 
                                                      
167  See Weeks, supra note 18. 
168  28 U.S.C § 1346(b) (2013). 
169  28 U.S.C § 2680(a) (2013). 
170  Dalehite v. U.S., 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
171  Id. at 42. 
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function.172  The Court instead extended the exception to any functions that 
involve the exercise of discretion and which are “susceptible to policy 
analysis” (whether or not the ultimate decision was actually informed by 
policy considerations), 173  potentially greatly expanding the range of 
administrative decisions to which the exception applies.  A 2002 study found 
that government agencies had successfully relied upon the discretionary 
function exception in 72% of its cases.174 
The FTCA explicitly includes omissions within the scope of the 
discretionary function exception.175   Courts have held that the exception 
applies where an omission results from a policy decision based on the need 
to balance competing factors.  For example, the exception has been applied 
on several occasions to failures to adequately signpost hazards within 
national parks.176  Although not a highly political function, decisions as to 
whether or not to erect a signpost involve a balancing between safety on the 
one hand, and the need to minimize disturbance to the natural environment 
on the other, as well as to manage finite resources. 
While state liability in England is a matter of common law, the 
English courts have also adopted an approach close to the discretionary 
function exception.  In Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, where the 
planning/operational distinction was imported from the American 
jurisprudence, the court held that public authorities would be immune from 
liability for the exercise of functions with respect to “policy” matters, 
provided that the exercise was intra vires.177  In the case of X (Minors) v. 
Bedfordshire County Council, the public law test of ultra vires was 
abandoned as a condition, and it was held that any decision involving an 
assessment of policy matters (such as social policy or the allocation of 
limited financial resources) would be non-justiciable.178 
More recently, however, courts have moved away somewhat from the 
planning (or “policy”) or operational distinction, noting that the distinction is 
not always helpful or reliable.179  Instead, courts have begun to emphasize 
                                                      
172  U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) 
173  Id. at 324-25. 
174  William G. Weaver & Thomas Longoria, Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity 
and the Discretionary Function Exception, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 335, 343 (2002). 
175  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2013). 
176  See e.g., Elder v. U.S., 312 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2002); Soldano v. U.S, 453 F.3d 140 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
177  Anns v. Merton London Bourough Council,  [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) 737 (appeal taken from Eng).    
Cf. the FTCA, under which the discretionary function exception will apply “whether or not the discretion 
involved be abused.” 
178  X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council, [1995] 2 A.C. 633 (H.L.) 646 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
179  Stovin v. Wise, [1996] A.C. 923 (H.L.) 950 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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the question of reasonableness for the purpose of breach of duty, rather than 
the existence of a duty of care.180  Nevertheless, the distinction continues to 
be influential.181 
It seems likely that many of the omissions to exercise regulatory 
functions with respect to TEPCO as identified by the independent 
commissions could be characterized as “planning” or “policy” functions, or 
“susceptible to policy analysis.”  This is particularly so for highly 
discretionary rule-making functions, such as the NSC’s powers to set safety 
standards.  Therefore, based on this strict distinction alone, equivalent 
omissions in the United States or England would arguably be unlikely to 
attract liability. 
As noted above, however, courts in Japan have increasingly intruded 
upon discretionary functions.  It did not seem to matter to the Supreme Court 
in either the Chikuhō or Minamata Disease cases that the functions 
complained of included highly discretionary rule-making functions, and 
moreover, were those exercised by a minister.  Indeed, in other State 
Compensation Law cases plaintiffs have even succeeded in holding the Diet 
liable for failure to pass legislation beneficial to their interests.182  
 
2. The Australian Approach: “Special Control” 
The High Court of Australia has also considered the 
planning/operational distinction,183 but to date has not adopted it.  The High 
Court has, however, suggested that the exercise or otherwise of a function 
will be for example, where it touches on “core policy” matters,184 or is of a 
“quasi-legislative” (i.e., rule-making) character.185 
Instead of the character of the function itself, Australian courts tend to 
focus on the conduct of the relevant public authority surrounding the 
exercise of the function.  With respect to regulatory failure, it is settled that 
the mere existence of a regulatory power will not give rise to a common law 
duty of care to exercise that power in order to avert harm.186  Nor is it 
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181  WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 654 (10th ed. 2009). 
182  The Overseas Voters Case, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 14, 2005, 59(7), SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2087 (Japan). 
183  See e.g., Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 68 (Austl.); Crimmins v Stevedoring 
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sufficient that the public authority is aware in a general sense of the potential 
risk of harm if it fails to exercise its power.187  Rather, a duty of care will 
only arise where some positive act by the authority has created the risk of 
harm or has specifically encouraged individuals to rely on the authority for 
ensuring their safety.188  Recent cases have also emphasized that a duty of 
care may arise where a public authority enjoys a “significant and special 
measure of control” over an individual’s safety or the safety of his/her 
property.189  “Control” does not exist simply because the authority has the 
power to regulate certain conduct; rather, the authority must be directly 
responsible for the source of the risk of harm.190 
Moreover, the existence of an actionable duty to exercise a function 
must be consistent with and anticipated by the relevant legislation granting 
the power to exercise it.  This will most commonly be the case where the 
subject of the power is an identifiable individual or class of persons, rather 
than the public at large.191 
 Two relatively recent cases in the context of asbestos litigation 
demonstrate the degree of “special control” required to establish a duty of 
care to exercise a regulatory function.  
The first of these is Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance 
Committee.192  Between 1961 and 1965, Mr. Crimmins was a stevedore on 
the docks of the Port of Melbourne.193  Under the system in place, stevedores 
were registered with the Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority, a public 
body that maintained a presence in the port and directed stevedores to work 
for particular employers on a casual basis (often for only hours at a time), 
loading and unloading ships. 194   While the Authority never directly 
employed stevedores, it was nevertheless responsible for paying the 
stevedores, including “attendance pay” where stevedores were assigned no 
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work, and could exercise certain disciplinary powers over them.195  It could, 
for example, suspend or deregister a stevedore who refused to comply with 
work assignments. 196   The Authority could also direct employers with 
respect to workplace safety.197  Although aware of the risk of exposure to 
asbestos products loaded and unloaded by stevedores, the Authority did not 
direct employers to provide the stevedores with protective respiratory 
equipment, which contributed to the development of Mr. Crimmins’s 
mesothelioma.198   
A majority of the High Court found that the Authority had a duty of 
care towards Mr. Crimmins and other stevedores.199  In a leading majority 
judgment, Judge McHugh noted that a duty could not ordinarily arise where 
a power was directed toward the benefit of the public at large,200 but that in 
this case, the relevant powers related very specifically to the stevedores.201 
The Authority’s disciplinary powers enabled it to compel Mr. Crimmins to 
work in circumstances in which there was a risk of harm, placing him at a 
“special vulnerability” to the Authority.202  Moreover, the Authority had a 
greater incentive to ensure workplace safety than the employers, which had 
usually employed Mr. Crimmins for only short periods of time.203 
However, Crimmins should be best understood as a unique case 
highlighting the exceptional degree of control by a public authority required 
to establish a duty of care.  The NSW case of Amaca v NSW also considered 
the liability of a public authority for failure to mandate workplace safety 
standards for handling asbestos, but was distinguished from Crimmins on the 
basis of the degree of control enjoyed by the authority.204  
The victim in Amaca, Mr. Hay, worked in the construction of a power 
station in NSW in the 1950s and 1960s, where he handled asbestos products 
without adequate respiratory equipment. 205   The government inspector 
regularly visited the worksite and investigated workplace safety, among 
other things, but made no specific directions regarding asbestos.206  After 
developing mesothelioma, Mr. Hay brought an action against his employer 
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and the owner of the power plant in the DDT. 207   Both defendants 
successfully cross-claimed against James Hardie, the manufacturer of the 
products used on the site, who in turn cross-claimed against the state of 
NSW.208  James Hardie argued that the NSW government had been generally 
aware of the dangers of asbestos, and was particularly aware of dangerous 
levels of asbestos dust onsite at Mr. Hay’s workplace as a result of a key 
inspection report.209  Therefore, it argued, the state should have mandated 
the use of respiratory equipment.210  The NSW Court of Appeal rejected 
those arguments, noting that in contrast to the Australian Stevedoring 
Industry Authority in Crimmins, the state through its inspectors exercised no 
day-to-day control over Mr. Hay’s working conditions.211  Nor did it have 
any greater knowledge of or incentive to eliminate the risk of harm than the 
other parties.212  Consequently, no duty of care arose.213 
The degree of control exercised by Japan’s nuclear regulators over 
residents surrounding the Fukushima plant arguably falls well short of the 
high watermark for control exercised by the stevedoring authority in 
Crimmins.  The NSC may have set general safety standards and NISA 
conducted inspections, but TEPCO remained responsible for the day-to-day 
operation of the Fukushima plant.  Other than at the initial stage of approval 
for the plant’s location, the government also had no control over residents 
proximity to the plant.  Indeed, NISA’s inspection powers are somewhat 
analogous to those of the government inspector in Amaca.  It therefore 
seems unlikely that either the NSC or NISA would be regarded as exercising 
“special control” over the victims of the disaster. 
By contrast, as noted above, the Chikuhō and Minamata Disease 
decisions appear to stand for the proposition that in Japan the mere 
knowledge of potential harm (or constructive knowledge, in the case of the 
Minamata Disease case) and the capacity to have exercised a regulatory 
power to prevent that harm can be sufficient to render the failure to regulate 
unreasonable. 
Given that to date more than half of a million claims have been 
received by TEPCO under its voluntary compensation program, there is also 
a question as to whom a duty to exercise regulatory functions over TEPCO 
may have been owed.  The Australian courts have adopted a principle not 
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unlike the Japanese reflexive interest principle, declining to impose a duty 
where a regulatory power is for the benefit of the public at large.  However, 
the applicability of the reflexive interest principle in regulatory failure cases 
in Japan is unclear, particularly where the relevant harm relates to personal 
health and safety.  The Supreme Court’s failure rely on the principle in the 
Chikuhō and Minamata Disease cases suggests that the principle may not 
apply.  Indeed, whereas the subject of the minister’s power to regulate mine 
safety in the Chikuhō case arguably related to an identifiable class of persons 
to whom a duty could be owed (i.e., coal miners), the same could not be said 
for the very general powers in the Minamata Disease case to regulate water 
quality in public waterways. 
 
VI. JUDICIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The case law in Australia points to a number of reasons why courts 
hesitate to recognize a duty of care in regulatory failure cases.  Courts in 
Australia, as in Japan and elsewhere, have been concerned to varying 
degrees about the degree to which it is constitutionally appropriate for them 
to judge the reasonableness of exercises of administrative discretion.  
However, as alluded to by Chief Justice Gleeson, as part of the majority in 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan, the position in Australia is that the 
question of whether to regulate a field of activity or not in the first place, or 
to leave industry to self-regulate in the shadow of private damages suits, is a 
highly political one, and often not suitable for resolution by the judiciary.214 
Relatedly, in cases where the impugned failure is a failure to regulate 
so as to prevent a third party from causing harm, Australian courts have 
found it particularly significant if the primary tortfeasor was not a public 
authority but rather a commercial actor with a self-interest in minimizing 
risk of harm.215  Requiring the government to take positive steps to prevent 
another party’s negligence is both inconsistent with the general common 
law’s reluctance to find a duty of care for omissions, and arguably reduces 
the moral culpability of the primary tortfeasor.  As Justice of Appeal Ipp 
noted in the leading judgment in Amaca, such arguments, when made by a 
primary tortfeasor, are “less than compelling from a social point of view.”216  
Japanese courts, on the other hand, have tended to regard public authorities 
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as less deserving of protection from liability than private defendants, 
precisely because they are compelled to act in the public interest.217 
Requiring public authorities to regulate to prevent third party 
negligence also potentially puts the government in the position of being an 
insurer of last resort whenever the primary tortfeasor cannot be identified or 
is insufficiently capitalized to pay damages, simply because the government 
has “deeper pockets.”  Judgments in several Australian cases have pointed to 
the “massive obligation” that could be borne by the state if it were liable for 
every missed opportunity to prevent harm.218  It is telling that the Chikuhō 
case was the first pneumoconiosis compensation case brought against the 
Japanese government, and only after most of Japan’s coal mining companies 
were closed.219 
Another more practical reason for denying liability is the difficulty of 
proving a counterfactual in order to demonstrate a causal relationship 
between the regulatory failure and the damage suffered.220  Courts run the 
risk of realizing too late which regulatory steps could have prevented harm, 
which in the case of the Fukushima disaster became clear only after months 
of detailed investigations.  Moreover, determining the precise point at which 
liability arose in the absence of a specific positive act can have arbitrary 
results, as seen by the Chikuhō case, where the Supreme Court held that the 
minister’s failure to regulate had only been unreasonable from the day of the 
passage of the Pneumoconiosis Law on March 31, 1960, thereby rejecting 
several claims predating the law.221  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In contrast with the Japanese government’s ostensibly inadequate 
regulation of TEPCO and other nuclear operators prior to the meltdown at 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, its response in facilitating the 
resolution and funding of claims related to the disaster demonstrates a 
significant degree of government intervention.  The government successfully 
convinced TEPCO to begin compensating victims only weeks after the 
disaster, thereby seriously impairing TEPCO’s ability to disclaim liability 
under the Nuclear Damages Compensation Law.  It then used its powers 
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under the law to set the terms for compensation and to put in place an ad hoc 
body under MEXT to mediate disputes in accordance with those terms.  It 
established a mandatory provider of financial assistance to TEPCO in the 
form of the now-permanent Nuclear Damages Liability Facilitation Fund, 
coercing all nuclear operators into participating in its funding.  The 
legislation establishing the Fund gives the government the power to direct 
TEPCO’s business conduct, effectively nationalizing the company and 
removing any possibility of independence. 
 Whether or not this level of intervention is desirable, it was arguably 
not necessary to achieve the aims of smoothly administering large volumes 
of claims against TEPCO and ensuring TEPCO’s solvency in order to pay 
them.  So much is clear from the response of the NSW government to mass 
tort claims for asbestos exposure.  The Japanese government could have 
established a specialized court in the same manner as the NSW Dust 
Diseases Tribunal, with the ability to quickly and flexibly resolve disputes 
but with the independence and enforcement powers of an ordinary civil court.  
Similarly, to ensure TEPCO’s solvency, the government could have entered 
into a simple financing agreement with a priority charge over TEPCO’s 
assets, as did the NSW government with James Hardie. 
From a legal perspective, the sharply differing responses of the 
Japanese government to claims arising from the Fukushima disaster and of 
the NSW government to the high volume of asbestos exposure cases can in 
part be explained by the desire of the Japanese government to minimize the 
risk of its own liability for damages to those affected by the disaster.  In 
contrast with jurisprudence on state liability for regulatory failure in 
common law countries, the approach taken in Japan means that there is a 
good possibility that the government would be found liable. 
The first reported claims against the government for its handling of 
the Fukushima disaster have now begun to emerge,222 but the government 
could face a deluge if TEPCO is allowed to fold or is too slow and 
unresponsive to claims.  Unlike TEPCO, which is limited in the amount it 
can pay to victims by the value of its assets, the Japanese government could 
be liable for an almost unlimited amount of damages.  The earlier Tōkaimura 
cases show that the potential scope of “nuclear damages” under the Nuclear 
Compensation Law is to be interpreted broadly, and a similar approach 
would no doubt be taken by courts, which are not bound by the Dispute 
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Reconciliation Committee’s Institutional Guidelines, to any claims with 
respect to the Fukushima disaster.  Such large-scale litigation could also 
institutionalize actions against the government as a legitimate response to 
third party torts wherever the government was a more attractive defendant, 
thereby opening the floodgates to the “massive obligations” that have 
concerned the Australian courts.  The incentives for the government to 
intervene in and manage the claims resolution process are clear. 
